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We provide evidence on the policy risk of social security in Hungary, Czech 
Republic and Slovakia by computing the changes in the social security wealth 
induced by the pension reforms undertaken since the 1990s. Methodologically we 
follow upon McHale’s (2001) study of selected reforms in G7 countries. However, as 
we measure the differential impact of the reform on workers of different genders, 
ages, and levels of education, we are able to capture the aggregate, intergenerational, 
and intragenerational aspects of the policy risk. Overall, the paper documents that 
also a pay-as-you-go system is not a secure source of retirement income since 
pension reforms do change the future contributions and benefits in different 
directions for different workers, and the magnitude o f the reductions in social 
security wealth sometimes exceeds several years’ worth of the workers’ earnings.  
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The choice between the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and fully funded pension system is 
sometimes being put in terms of a trade-off between return and risk. The funded system 
should provide a higher expected return on workers contributions at the cost of exposing the 
workers to the investment risk (Feldstein (2005a,b), Lindbeck and Persson (2003)). Since 
contributions are invested into stock and bonds which yield uncertain returns, workers face 
uncertainty about the level of their pension when they retire. Feldstein and Ranguelova 
(2001), Feldstein, Ranguelova and Samwick (2001) and Poterba et al (2005)) produced 
quantitative estimates of the distribution of benefits upon retirement in a risky funded 
scheme, and made expected utility comparisons between the funded and PAYG schemes. 
 
However, the PAYG systems are not risk-free either. The rules of the pension system may be 
changed any time as governments respond to demographic, economic or political shocks. As 
a consequence of this so-called policy risk, the contributions actually paid and  benefits 
actually received by a worker may differ substantially from what she was promised by the 
pension legislation at various moments in her lifetime. Appropriate comparisons between the 
PAYG system and privately funded system should therefore involve a comparison of two 
risky systems. 
 
An emerging literature has already produced some quantifications of the magnitude of the 
policy risk. McHale (2001) computes the change in the present value of benefits induced by 
pension reforms that were implemented in the G7 countries during the 1990’s for average 
workers at age forty-five and at the standard retirement age. He finds that some of the   2 
reforms reduced the present value of benefits by as much as 29% (the Italian 1992 reform) or 
26% (the German 1992 reform). McHale’s contribution was valuable as it demonstrated that 
cuts in benefits do happen and can be substantial. Shoven and Slavov (2006) compute the 
internal rates of return from social security in the United States since 1939 for an average, 
10
th percentile, and 90
th percentile worker in 1900-1985 birth cohorts. They find "a 
considerable variation in the internal rates of return through time for a given birth cohort". 
They also find substantial differences in IRR’s across cohorts. Blake (2004) shows that even 
the private pensions in the United Kingdom have not been completely immune from policy 
risk, but have been less sensitive than the public pensions. Holst (2005) looks at a 
representative worker in cohorts that have already retired in the United States Germany and 
computes the discrepancy between the social security wealth
1 (SSW) that they were promised 
at age 55 and at retirement. He also makes the first attempt to explain the deviation between 
realized and promised SSW by demographic variables. 
 
In this paper, we provide a detailed descriptive account of the policy risk of social security in 
three Central European countries, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. We compute the 
impact of all major changes in pension legislation adopted since the early 1990’s on the 
social security wealth of workers of different ages, genders, and education levels. Altogether 
these countries undertook ten reforms during the span of 14 years covered in this paper. The 
reforms naturally differed in their breadth, from minor adjustments of some parameters to 
more radical modernizations of outdated schemes inherited from the communist era to full-
scale reforms introducing a mandatory funded pillar (Hungary 1998, Slovakia 2005). 
 
Methodologically our approach is similar to McHale (2001) except that our definition of the 
SSW deducts the present value (PV) of contributions from the PV of benefits. In our opinion 
it is appropriate to deduct the contributions as they are an important component of the 
worker’s lifetime wealth. For example, a reform that only raises the contributions clearly 
makes a worker worse off even thought the PV of benefits remains unchanged.  
 
The contribution of the paper is not just to compute the changes in SSW in different countries 
but also to provide a more comprehensive picture of the policy risk. The preceding literature 
generally computes the changes in SSW for a representative worker in different cohorts. It 
                                                           
1 The social security wealth is the expected present value of the future stream of pension benefits minus the 
expected present value of future contributions.   3 
thus captures only the aggregate component of the policy risk (i.e., the risk that a reform hurts 
all workers) and the intergenerational component (i.e. the risk that a reform will affect one’s 
cohort differently than others). However, most pay-as-you-go systems also redistribute 
income within cohort. This introduces an intragenerational component to the policy risk, i.e. 
the risk that a reform will affect one’s income group or gender differently than others. As we 
carry our analysis separately for men and women with different levels of education and for all 
pre-retirement cohorts we document both the intergenerational and intragenerational impacts 
of the pension reforms on the SSW.  
 
Although each of the reforms had unique impacts, our results do allow several 
generalizations. Most importantly, pension reforms produced large shifts in the SSW and as 
such create substantial uncertainty. In 7 of the 10 reforms covered in this paper, there were 
some workers whose SSW declined by an amount equal to or greater than the average annual 
earnings in their country, and in 5 reforms there were some workers whose SSW declined by 
more than twice the average annual earnings. Reforms typically have largely differential 
impact across cohorts, genders, and education levels. Seven reforms produced both winners 
as well as losers; e.g there were both workers whose SSW increased and workers whose SSW 
fell. The Hungarian 1998 reform was most notable in this respect as it effectively created 
different sets of rules for workers who would retire before 2012 or after 2012. As a 
consequence, the SSW of university-educated men born in 1951 rose by approximately 1.6 
average annual earnings more than SSW of otherwise identical men born just before 1951. As 
for the intergenerational redistribution, in four of the reforms the older cohorts gained relative 
to the younger ones (or at least lost less). While McHale (2001) observes that workers in the 
G7 countries aged slightly below the retirement age were essentially insulated from cuts in 
their SSW, this was not generally the case of the reforms studied here. In four other reforms 
the older workers fared worse relative to the younger ones. Specifically, the Hungarian 1993 
reform reduced the SSW of women of pre-retirement ages by between 0.5 to 1.4 average 
annual earnings; the 1998 reform was more severe as it reduced the SSW of both men and 
women of pre-retirement ages by between 1.1 to 2.5 average annual earnings. The Czech 
1996 and Slovak 2006 reforms also hurt men of pre-retirement ages.  
   4 
As for the intragenerational redistribution, most reforms have larger impact (positive or 
negative) on the SSW of workers with higher education. This is in part due to the fact that 
they have higher contributions and benefits in absolute terms. More interestingly, none of the 
reforms simultaneously benefited workers with lower education and hurt workers with higher 
education. Each of the countries had at least one reform in which workers with university 
education benefited substantially relative to the workers with low education (Hungary 1998, 
Czech Republic 1996, Slovakia 2004-05). The Slovak 2004-05 was extreme in this regard, as 
for example 50-year old men with elementary education lost 1.8 average annual earnings 
while equally aged men with university education gained 4.7 average annual earnings. All 
three countries inherited highly egalitarian pension schemes from the communist era, 
therefore such changes in the benefit formula were understandably motivated by the desire to 
reduce the degree of redistribution. Nevertheless, the very fact that also some older poor 
workers experienced large cuts in SSW is troubling as these workers usually typically have 
neither sufficient savings to cushion the cuts in benefits nor enough years of remaining 
working life to build them up.  
 
Another observation concerns the political dynamics. Each of the two truly radical reforms 
that introduced a funded pillar was quickly followed by another reform that mitigated some 
of its aspects. Should these two cases be generalized, radical reforms tend to suffer from an 
early reversal similar to one analyzed in the context of economic transition (Roland 2002). 
On one hand this makes the SSW more volatile as one reform breeds yet another reform, on 
the other hand it makes it less volatile as long as the reversal reform brings the SSW closer to 
the level it had had prior to the initial reform. Workers should somewhat discount the rules 
laid out by the first reform when making plans for the future.  
 
As an interesting byproduct of our analysis we find that in Hungary and Slovakia workers are 
not made better off  by opting into the mixed (partially funded) system. The expected returns 
on savings in the pension funds are too low for the private pension to exceed the PAYG 
pension promised by the current legislation. This can be attributed to two factors. First, the 
returns do appear to be low due to a combination of poor historical performance, overly 
conservative investment strategies, and high fees charged by the funds. The policy lesson is 
that the rules governing the pension funds are indeed critical in order to provide workers with   5 
high return on their savings and to keep the administrative costs low. Our calculations 
indicate that neither Hungary nor Slovakia have set the rules well enough to realize the 
potential of the funded system. Second, despite the fact that the PAYG provides higher SSW 
a large fraction of workers switched to the mixed system (50 % in Hungary, 60% in 
Slovakia). This is consistent with the hypothesis that workers do not take the pension 
promises at face value but instead anticipate that there will be additional reforms in the future 
that will reduce the PAYG benefits. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodology for 
computing the social security wealth and the assumptions involved. Section 3 provides a brief 
institutional background on the pension reforms in Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia 
and we present the results for individual pension reforms. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology and data  
Social security wealth (SSW) is defined as the difference between the present  value of 
expected future benefits and contributions promised to workers under the current pension 
legislation. We compute the impact of each reform on the SSW of all cohorts were either 
working as of time of the reform or were born but not yet working, and within each cohort, 
we carry out the computation separately for men and women and for representative workers 
with different levels of education: elementary, lower secondary (apprenticeship), upper 
secondary (high-school with a school-leaving exam), and college/university.  
 
The SSW for each cohort  (a) at the time of reform  (T) is calculated according to the 
following formula: 
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where  R is the year of retirement,  t is a current year, Ce and  Cr are the employee and 
employer contributions, respectively, B is the value of the initial pension, r is the discount 
rate, w is a gross nominal wage,  ) ( T t S is probability of surviving till year t conditional on 
being alive at T, and i is the rate at which the benefits are indexed. Calculating the SSW 
involves three basic steps. First, the discounted value of future contributions is calculated   6 
from a projected path of wages and contribution rates specified by current legislation. Note 
that they include contributions paid by both the employee and the employer. Second, the 
initial benefit is computed according to the formula prescribed in the legislation. Third, the 
discounted value of benefits is computed using the current indexation rules and a projected 
path of variables that affect the indexations. To put the results in perspective we normalize 
the change in SSW by the average annual earnings in the economy in the year of the reform. 
A change in SSW by -1.0 units hence means that the worker lost SSW equivalent to annual 
earnings of an average worker.
2  
 
Computing the social security wealth required a number of assumptions about the wage 
profiles of workers, evolution of certain variables in the future, and returns on savings in the 
pension funds. These assumptions and the data used to construct them are described in detail 
in Appendix A. Our general principle is that we attempt to compute the SSW under a 
legislation as it is written on the books and as actually implemented. For example, if a 
particular reform was passed with an understanding that some additional changes will be 
made in the future, we ignore those envisioned but not legislated changes.
3 Similarly the rates 
of return on the savings in the pension funds are to a large extent affected by regulations of 
the funds’ portfolio choices and performance embedded in the pension legislation. Our 
assumptions about the future returns are thus based on the actual portfolio choices and 
performance of the funds instead of on arbitrary stock and bond market indices which are 
rather indicators of potential returns that the funds could have earned.  
 
Our representative” workers start working at age 20, work without interruption until the 
standard retirement age, and at each age they are earning the wage that is predicted by the 
wage profile specific for their gender, education level, and calendar year. The wage profiles 
were estimated for each country from large individual-level datasets. The length of life is 
probabilistic, and the future taxes and benefits are discounted by the survival probability.  
 
While the above assumptions are natural they inevitably have some limitations. Analyzing 
only the representative workers does not fully characterize the impact of the reforms across 
                                                           
2 The level of SSW of the worker who is at the beginning of the working career also indicates the degree of 
redistribution built into the PAYG system. If it is positive, the system effectively provides a net transfer to the 
worker, while if it is negative, the system effectively taxes the worker.   7 
the income distribution. Likewise, the assumption that the worker’s wages follow a typical 
wage profile and that the worker is employed without interruption leaves out a part of the 
intragenerational component of the risk. Two workers with identical lifetime earnings may be 
affected differently by a particular reform if they differ in their individual wage profiles or 
working histories. Also, by assuming that workers work until the standard retirement age we 
do not analyze the impact of changes in early retirement provisions that were part of some of 
the reforms studied here and undoubtedly affected the workers who choose to exercise the 
early retirement option. Analysis of such finer impacts of reforms would be worthwhile but 
would require detailed data on individual working histories that were not available to us. 
 
We assume that as of the time of the reform people had perfect foresight about the future 
evolution of the relevant variables. That is, the actual wages, inflation, and returns on assets 
in pension funds until 2005 are used as the expected wages, inflation, and returns as of time 
of the reform. For the years 2006 onwards, we assume a 3% growth rate of real wages for all 
education categories and genders, and a 2% inflation rate.
4 To project the future returns on 
savings in the Hungarian pension funds, we compute their average returns realized since the 
time they were established (1998). For Slovakia, which introduced pension funds too recently 
to infer their historical returns, we set the expected future returns equal to the average 
historical return on the portfolios that the funds currently hold. The fees charged by the funds 
are deducted from gross returns.  
 
3. Description of reforms and their impact on SSW 
The key characteristics of reforms are summarized in Table A. Tables H.1-10, C.1-2, and S1-
4 present the main result, the change in SSW separately for men and women of different 
levels of education and birth cohorts. When the pension system has two pillars, separate 
tables are reported for workers in the PAYG pillar and the mixed pillar. Due to space 
limitations, we report results averaged over cohorts born during 5-year intervals.
5 Figures 
H.1-10, C.1-5 and S.1-6 illustrate the impact of each reform for selected genders and 
education levels, and also separate the overall impact into a change in contributions and a 
change in benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 The Hungarian 1998 reform is the most significant case; see section 3.c. 
4 These are roughly the rates of wage growth and inflation currently experienced by all countries. 




3a. Hungary: Reform 1993 
At the beginning of transition, Hungary had a pay-as-you-go pension system that had 
remained unchanged since the mid 1970’s.
6 The first reform came in 1993, and since then 
there were five other reforms. The 1993 reform
7 postponed the retirement age for women 
gradually from 55 to 60 and modified the benefit formula. Before the reform the initial 
benefit was based on earnings during 4 years with the highest earnings in the period of 5 
years before retirement while after it was based on earnings from 1988 until retirement. The 
benefit was set as a certain fraction (referred to as pension accrual) of average earnings 
during the period considered. 
 
The reform did not affect the contributions paid by men, and its overall impact on the SSW of 
men was negligible. It had a negative impact on all cohorts of women who lost between 0.38 
to 2.15 annual average earnings (Table H.1). Postponement of the retirement age is 
responsible for an increase in the PV of contributions that, in percentage terms, is particularly 
pronounced for the cohorts close to retirement (by 50% - 100%). The new benefit formula 
was relatively more favorable to workers with lower wages, as evidenced by an increase in 
the PV of benefits for women with elementary education (Figure H.1) compared to a decrease 
for women with university education (Figure H.2). This is due to the fact that the wage 
profiles for workers with university education are steeper. Since the new formula counts also 
the earlier years when their earnings lower than in their pre-retirement years, the average 
earnings used by the formula are effectively reduced. This effectively reduces the average 
earnings during the period considered.  
 
3b. Hungary: Reform 1997 
The 1997 reform
8 postponed the retirement age for men and women gradually to 62. 
However, it shifted the retirement age back by 1 year for women born between 1942-1944. 
                                                           
6 The Social Security Act of 1975 (Law No. 1975 II). 
7 Law No. 1993 VIII 
8 Law No. 1996 LIX and 1996 LXXXVII   9 
The contribution rate paid by employers was reduced from 24.5% to 24%, and the pension 
accrual increased by 1.5% - 8% depending on the number of years worked.  
 
The reform was clearly beneficial for women born between 1942-44 whose SSW rose by as 
much as 2 average annual earnings (Figure H.3). For the younger women, higher accrual and 
lower contributions did not compensate for the postponed retirement, and their SSW fell by 
approximately 0.4 (upper secondary education) and 0.8 (university education) average annual 
earnings. Men close to retirement lost between 0.7 (elementary education) to 1.66 (university 
education) average annual earnings. Younger cohorts lost gradually less, those just entering 
the labor market lost about 4 times less than their counterparts close to retirement.  
 
3c. Hungary: Reform 1998 
The fundamental reform of 1998
9 split the mandatory PAYG system into a public PAYG and 
a privately funded pillar. The workers already employed had the option to switch from the 
public to the mixed system and more than 50% of eligible workers did switch
10. For new 
entrants to the labor market participation in the mixed system was compulsory. Workers in 
the mixed system will have their benefit from the public pillar reduced by 25%.  
 
The employer contribution was reduced from 24% to 23% by 1999 and to 22% by 2000. At 
the same time the employee contribution was gradually increased from 6% to 9% by 2000. 
From this percentage employees in the mixed system had to pay 1% to the PAYG pillar and 
the rest of their contribution went to the private pillar.  
 
The benefit formula remains unaffected until 2013 after which it should switch from the net 
to the gross principle, meaning that the benefit will then be set as a fraction of average gross 
earnings instead of net earnings. It was also planned that benefits would become taxable at 
the same time; however, the corresponding change in the income tax code has not been 
implemented. This rather ambiguous provision creates additional uncertainty over whether 
                                                           
9 Law No. 1997 LXXX deals with contributions, Law No. 1997 LXXXI regulates the Social Security Pension 
Scheme (public PAYG, 1
st pillar), Law No. 1997 LXXXII establishes the legal framework for the Mandatory 
Private Pension Funds (2
nd pillar) 
10 Augusztinovics et al (2002).   10 
benefits will be taxable at all after 2013, and if so, what the income tax rates will be at that 
time. 
 
The reform implies that a worker who retires at standard retirement age in 2012 will have his 
initial benefit calculated as 83% of the average net earnings. A worker one year younger than 
him retiring in 2013 will have his initial benefit set at 69.3% of the average gross earnings. 
The latter amount is approximately 20% higher than what the older retiree will receive. 
Should the benefits indeed become taxable at current income tax rates, the additional income 
tax should approximately erase the 20% difference, although the exact percentage will vary 
across retirees as they face different marginal tax rates. Since our goal is to evaluate the 
impact of reforms as they were actually legislated, we do not subtract any income tax when 
we compute the benefits after 2012.  
 
The i ndexation rule was changed gradually from the net wage indexation to the Swiss 
indexation (50% CPI and 50% net wage growth). The income brackets in the benefit formula 
were indexed by nominal wage growth till 1998 while between 1998 till 2013 they were to be 
indexed by nominal wage growth plus 8%. The annuities from the funded pillar must be 
unisex and also indexed by Swiss indexation.  
 
Results are reported separately for workers who stayed in the PAYG system and those who 
switched to the mixed system (Tables H.3 and H.4). The PV of contributions in the pure 
PAYG rose by 3.3% for all workers (Figures H.4, H.5 and H.6). Changes in the present value 
of benefits vary substantially across cohorts, genders, and education levels. Those already 
retired saw their benefits cut by about 20% due to a gradual switch to the Swiss indexation. 
Benefits rose for the 1942-1950 cohorts as they were also affected by faster indexation of 
income brackets in the benefit formula. It increased the PV of benefits for men with 
elementary education only slightly (by approximately 1%, Figure H.6) but for men with 
university education substantially (by approximately 49%, Figure H.7). Cohorts retiring since 
2013 will have their benefits set according to a new formula. For them it implied a large 
increase in the PV of benefits - by 80% (!) for men with university education born in 1951 at 
the extreme. For the post-1950 cohorts of workers with lower earnings this increase is less 
dramatic since they face a smaller gap between gross and net earnings (compare Figures H.6 
and H.7).    11 
 
In SSW terms, men and women with university education were the clear winners as they 
gained at least 2 average annual earnings. Among them, the cohorts born in the 1950’s did 
particularly well (gained 3.2 to 3.5 average annual earnings). Both men and women with 
upper secondary education gained less than 1 average annual earnings, and again those born 
in the 1950’s were treated better than cohorts born both earlier and later. Finally, workers 
with lower education levels were unaffected or mildly negatively affected (the largest loss of 
0.57 average annual earnings was suffered by women with elementary education born in the 
late 1940’s.) 
 
Outcomes of workers who switched to the mixed system reveal a surprising result – most 
workers should not gain by switching or gain only marginally. Consider the group that 
supposedly has most to gain from switching to the private pillar, i.e., men with university 
education at the beginning of their career (1975-79 cohorts). Their gain from the reform is 
2.28 average annual earnings if they switch, but 2.27 if they stay in the PAYG. This is largely 
due to the generous increase in PAYG benefits stipulated by the reform. Since older cohorts 
contribute to the PAYG for a shorter time, they d o not accumulate enough savings to 
compensate for the 25% cut in the PAYG benefit, and so they are relatively even worse off 
by switching. The differential impact of the reform on the switchers and stayers is similar, 
although less pronounced in magnitude, for other types of workers. It should be pointed out 
that if the PAYG benefits do become taxable after 2013, the gains to switching to the mixed 
system relative to staying in the PAYG system will be more favorable that our computations 
suggest. 
 
3d. Hungary: Reform 1999 
Mere one year later, the new government which had been opposed to private pensions 
adopted adjustments that scaled down the importance of the private pillar.
11 It cancelled the 
increase in employees’ contribution to the private pillar that was promised by the previous 
legislation; workers in the mixed system had to contribute additional 1% to the PAYG pillar, 
and employers’ contribution was to be cut from 23% to 22% by 1999 and to 21% by 2000.  
   12 
In percentage terms, the reform had the same effect on all education levels, but differential 
impact on different cohorts and on workers in the mixed system vis-à-vis workers in the pure 
PAYG. Figures H.7 and H.8 show that while men in both systems experienced a 3% cut in 
contributions, workers in the PAYG had their benefits unaffected while cohorts 1951 and 
younger in the mixed system saw the PV of their benefits decline by 2.6-6.5 % (gradually 
more for younger cohorts, who, due to longer accumulation of savings, have a greater gap 
between the benefit from the funded pillar and the benefit from the PAYG pillar). In SSW 
terms, the reform benefited everyone in the pure PAYG system by the order of 0.2 to 0.5 
average annual earnings, and had negligible net effect on the SSW of workers in the mixed 
system.  
 
3e. Hungary: Reform 2003 
The 2003 reform
12 increased employees’ contributions from 8% to 8.5%, reduced 
contributions to the PAYG pillar to 1.5% for workers in the mixed system, and increased 
their contribution to the private pillar form 6% to 7%. The major change brought by this 
reform was a gradual introduction of an additional monthly benefit (13
th monthly pension) 
within the PAYG pillar. Initially set at 25% of the regular benefit, this additional is planned 
to gradually increase such that pensioners would effectively receive their benefits 13 times a 
year from 2006 onwards.  
 
In SSW terms, the reform increased SSW of all workers by 0.1 to 0.8 average annual 
earnings. It was more beneficial to older workers in the pure PAYG system (who typically 
gained between 0.1 to 0.2. average annual earnings more than their counterparts in the mixed 
system; see Table H.7). It was also more advantageous to cohorts close to retirement than to 
younger cohorts. (E.g. women with university education born in the late 1950’s gained 0.66 
average annual earnings while those born in the early 1990’s gained 0.34 average annual 
earnings, and similar relative differences are observed for other types of workers.) Figure H.9 
illustrates the change in the PV of contributions and benefits for men with upper secondary 
education.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 Law No. 1998 LXVII 
12 Law No. 2003 IV   13 
3f. Hungary: Reform 2007 
The last reform covered in this paper
13 was motivated by cutting budget deficits. While the 
previous legislation was prescribing a reduction in employer contributions from 18% to 16% 
by 2009, the 2007 reform raised the employer contributions to 21%. The reform also affected 
the benefit formula for workers who would retire between 2008 and 2012 by changing the 
deduction of health care and unemployment insurance in a way that will effectively reduce 
the benefit. On the other hand the reform adjusted future indexation in a way that will slightly 
increase the future benefits. Specifically, earnings during the whole life will be indexed to the 
level of the individual’s last working year, while before the reform earnings in last three 
working years were not indexed at all. The pension accrual will increase by 0.5% for each 
additional year but only for workers with more than 40 years of working history. The reform 
did not affect pensions that would be newly granted after 2012.  
 
The combined effect of these changes was clearly negative, especially for workers with 
higher education and for all younger workers. The new formula cut the initial benefit by 5-
6% for cohorts 1946-1950, which is demonstrated in Figure H.10. In addition, the PV of 
contributions increased by 15-20%. The differential impact of the reform for different 
educational categories shows that the SSW of men with elementary education decreased by 
only 0.35 to 1.1 average annual earnings, while the SSW of men with university education 
decreased by 0.85 to 2.5 average annual earnings (Tables H.9-10).  
 
3g. Czech Republic: Reform 1996 
The Czech Republic has a very traditional pay-as-you-go, defined benefit pension system. 
The 1996 reform
14, the first one undertaken after the end of communism, changed most of its 
parameters.  
 
The new benefit formula introduced a flat component of the benefit (same for all retirees) and 
at the same time made the variable component (which depends with the workers average 
lifetime earnings) less regressive; among other changes, it abolished the ceiling on the 
                                                           
13 Law No. 2006 CVI 
14 Law No. 155/1995.   14 
maximum benefit
15. It also increased the number of years over which the average earnings 
are computed – before the reform the initial benefit was based on earnings during 5 years 
with the highest earnings in the period of 10 years preceding retirement while after it was 
based on earnings during 30 years preceding retirement, or years since 1986, whichever is 
shorter.  
 
The reform did not affect the contribution rates which were 6.50% (employee) and 19.5% 
(employer). The standard retirement age was increased by 2 years for men (from 60 to 62 for 
men) and by 5 years for women (from 55 to 60 for women with two children).
16 The increase 




The pre-reform system lacked any built-in adjustments to inflation. Once granted, the benefits 
were fixed and the legislation did not provide any rule for their indexation. High inflation 
during the early 1990’s exposed this major drawback.
18 Benefits granted in the past declined 
in real terms and newly granted benefits also lost value because they were based on historical 
wages and brackets in the benefit formula that were not revalued to current levels. 
 
Prior to the reform the government was compensating for inflation by passing ad-hoc 
increases in benefits. The 1996 legislation laid out stable indexation rules. The benefits had to 
be indexed for inflation plus at least once every two years also for at least 33% of the real 
wage growth.
19 The law, however, prescribed only minimum increases and gave the 
government the discretion to increase benefits more generously. In practice, the indexations 
were more generous.
20 The past earnings used to compute the average earnings were to be 
indexed by the wage index.
21 
                                                           
15 Effectively, workers with average earnings exceeding CZK 10,000, or 90% of the average earnings in 1996, 
received benefits equal to the ceiling. 
16 It is a peculiar feature of the Czech pension system that the standard retirement age of women declines in the 
number of children. Before the 1996 reform it was 57 for childless women, 56 for women with one child, 55 for 
women with two children, 54 (three or four children) or 53 (five and more children). 
17 Higher retirement age was somewhat neutralized by several options for early retirement  – for example, 
workers who were unemployed for more than half a year could  retire 2 years before reaching the standard 
retirement age, and their pension was somewhat reduced. 
18 The inflation rate exceeded 9% every year between 1991 and 1995 and was as high as 50% in 1991. 
19 The timing of indexation was not annual but instead should occur each time when the increase in the 
consumer price index accumulated since the last increase exceeded 5%. 
20 Duš ek (2007). 
21 The last feature of the 1996 reform relevant to our computations was its safeguard against making some new 
retirees explicitly worse off. The entry benefit had to be compared with the benefit that the retiree would have   15 
 
Table C.1 shows the impact of the reform on SSW. Except for the cohorts that were just 
about to retire, all cohorts lost. The losses are larger for the younger cohorts and for workers 
with lower education.  
 
Figure C.1 illustrates the results for men with lower secondary education (who have slightly 
less than average earnings). The PV of contributions increased for all cohorts as the 
retirement age was postponed. The percentage increase is naturally most dramatic for the 
cohort close to retirement. The PV of benefits declined for all cohorts except the 1936 cohort 
which was just about to retire, and declined more severely (by 18-25%) for the post-1944 
cohorts as they were fully affected by the postponement of the retirement age.  
 
The level and change in SSW of men with lower secondary education is illustrated in Figure 
C.2. The pre-reform system was generous to them in the sense that the SSW of the 1975 
cohort was 3.89 average annual earnings above zero, and the reform reduced it to 1.05. 
Almost all cohorts lost. The losses are increasing in the cohort’s year of birth and there are 
large differences among cohorts close to retirement – while the 1937 cohort was essentially 
unaffected, the 1944 cohort lost 1.68 average annual earnings. All remaining cohorts that 
were working at the time of the reform (1945-1975) lost approximately 2 annual average 
earnings, while the younger cohorts lost even more (on the order of 3 annual wages).  
 
The negative impact on the SSW was less pronounced for workers with university education 
(see Table C.1.). The main reason is the less regressive benefit formula. Except for the 
cohorts close to retirement, all cohorts lost about 2 average annual earnings. For women, the 
reform implied higher increases in contributions and comparable cuts in benefits (see Figure 
C.3). The pattern of losses for women is similar to that of men, although women lost more in 
absolute terms (by 0.1 to 0.2 average annual earnings) than men o f the same age and 
education.
22 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
been entitled to under the pre-1996 legislation, and if the latter was higher she would still receive the “old” entry 
benefit. This provision was abandoned in 2005.  
 
22 We also checked whether our main result is not driven by a conservative assumption that benefits after 2005 
would be indexed by the minimum prescribed by the reform legislation since the actual increases up to 2005 
were more generous. To check robustness, we re-ran our computations with an assumption that benefits are 
indexed annually for inflation plus 33% of real wage growth, as later legislated in 2002. This had a negligible 
effect on the results for example, the reduction in SSW for women (for  whom indexation rules are more 
important as they live longer) is smaller by 0.2 to 0.3 annual average earnings.   16 
 
3h. Czech Republic: Reform 2002-2003 
The next reform (adopted through two laws passed in 2002 and 2003 which we consider to be 
a single reform package
23) was intended to improve the long-term financial sustainability of 
the PAYG system. It changed the indexation rule such that the benefits had to be adjusted 
annually and the minimum increase in benefits had to include inflation plus at least 33% of 
the real wage growth. This change merely codified the existing practice. Second, the 
retirement age was further postponed such that it would reach 63 for men and 61 for women 
by 2013. Third, employers’ contributions were increased from 19.5% to 21.5%.
24  
 
All workers lost from this reform, and women lost more than comparable men in absolute 
terms. Figures C.4-C.5 compare the outcomes for men and women with upper secondary 
education. The reform increased the PV of contributions for all cohorts by raising the 
contribution rates and postponing the retirement age. It was most pronounced for the cohorts 
that were close to retirement and at the same time were fully affected by the phased-in 
postponement of the retirement age (i.e., the 1953 cohort whose contributions rose by 14%). 
Younger cohorts were affected less (contributions rose by 9.2% for all cohorts that were not 
working yet as of 2003). The combination of more generous indexation and a postponed 
retirement age implied a very slight increase in the PV of benefits for the 1942-1945 cohorts 
and a reduction for all younger cohorts. The reduction is proportional for all cohorts that were 
fully affected by the postponement of the retirement age and varies between 4.9-6.5%. 
Translating into SSW (Table C.2), the reform reduced SSW by approximately 1.0 average 
annual earnings for all men born after 1955, and proportionately less for older cohorts (the 
1942-1949 cohorts were little affected). For women, the patterns are similar but the SSW 
reductions are about 10-20% greater in absolute magnitude than for men (e.g., while the SSW 
men with upper secondary education entering the labor market – the 1982 cohort – fell by 




                                                           
23 Law No. 264/2002 and 425/2003. 
24 The reform also reduced the extent to which the time spent in school and other non-work activities can be 
counted as years of employment in the benefit formula and it made early retirement less generous and gradually 
increased the contribution rates of the self-employed. As our computations concern only employees who work 
till the retirement age, these aspects of the reform are not captured in our results.   17 
3i. Slovakia: Reform 2004 - 2005  
As Czechoslovakia split in 1993, Slovakia inherited the same pension system as the Czech 
Republic did. In the Slovak case, however, it remained unreformed until 2004. In the late 
1990’s the PAYG system generated a deficit caused by a combination of high unemployment 
and high evasion attributed to a weak connection between contributions and benefits 
(Melichercik and Ungvarsky (2004)). The government in response pushed through two 
successive reform packages in 2004 and 2005 which should be regarded as a single reform.
25  
 
The reform increased the retirement age from 55 to 62 years for women
26 and from 60 to 62 
years for men. The increase was phased-in gradually such that the target retirement is reached 
in 2020 for women and in 2006 for men. The contribution rates were decreased from 20.6% 
to 16% (employer) and from 5.9% to 4% (employee). In addition, one of the parents could 
deduct additional 0.5% from contributions for every child aged below 26 as long as the child 
was studying.  
 
The new benefit formula made the benefit linear in the worker’s average earnings over his 
entire working history since 1994, up to a cap beyond which workers with more than 3 times 
the average earnings do not receive higher benefits. The formula set the benefit as the 
workers’ average earnings times the number of working years times a number (the so called 
actual pension value) set such that a worker who has been working for 40 years and has 
always had the average wage in the economy achieves a 50% replacement rate 
 
The reform provided for a transitory period, initially legislated to last till 2006, during which 
the benefits were in fact regressive in the worker’s lifetime earnings but were gradually 
becoming less regressive over time.
27 Compared to the old formula, the new one gave higher 
benefits to high-wage workers. The ad-hoc adjustments in benefits were replaced by the 
                                                           
25 Laws No. 461/2003, 43/2004 and No. 121/2005.  
26 This is the case of women with two children. For women with no children the eligible age increased from 57, 
with 1 child from 56, with 3-4 children from 54 and for women with 5 or more children it gradually increased 
from 53 to 62. 
27 Specifically, the benefit is set as B = APV * N * APWP where APV is the actual pension value, N is a 
number of years of paying contributions, and APWP is the average personal wage point, i.e., the average ratio of 
the individual’s annual gross earnings to the average annual gross earnings in the economy during the 
individual’s whole working career. If the workers’ APWP is less than 1, certain percentage of the difference 
between 1 and  APWP is added to the original APWP, while if APWP is between 1.25 and 3, a certain 
percentage of the difference between APWP and 1.25 is deducted. The percentage difference to be 
added/deducted was 60% in 2004, 40% in 2005 and 20% in 2006. Only APWP between 1 and 1.25 is counted   18 
Swiss indexation, i.e. the benefits are increased by the average of the nominal wage growth 
and inflation in the economy.  
 
The mandatory PAYG system was split into a public PAYG pillar and a mandatory fully 
funded pillar. The mixed system is mandatory for new entrants to the labor market. Workers 
aged below 52 had a choice to switch from pure PAYG to a mixed system, and 60% of 
workers did switch by 2006. After switching the workers could not return back to the pure 
PAYG system.  
 
The employees’ contribution rates to the PAYG pillar remained unchanged. The employers’ 
contributions were reduced from to 14%. For switchers, the employers’ contribution is split 
such that 5% goes to the PAYG pillar and 9% to the funded pillar. The PAYG benefits for 




Savings into the funded pillar are managed by pension fund administrators who in turn have 
to offer three types of pension funds differentiated by  their risk and expected return – a 
growth, balanced, and conservative fund. Conservative funds may invest only in bonds and 
money market instruments and must be secured against the currency risk. The balanced funds 
must invest at least 50% of its assets in bonds and money market instruments and at most 
50% in stocks. The growth funds may invest at most 80% of their assets in stocks and at most 
80% of their investments may be left unsecured against the currency risk. The worker’s 
choice of the type of the pension fund is regulated in order to prevent a significant loss as the 
worker approaches the retirement age.
29 
 
The fees that the pension fund administrators may charge are regulated. They may charge 
0.07% of the average monthly net value of the assets plus 1% of the amount of a monthly 
contribution.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
without adjustments. After the transitory period, the benefits should increase linearly in one’s average lifetime 
earnings. 
28 The PAYG benefit formula for the switchers is B = = APV * APWP*(N - M/2), where M is a number of years 
of paying contribution in the mixed system.  
29 Young workers can choose the pension fund according to their risk preferences. Workers with less than 15 
years until retirement age cannot invest in the growth fund while workers with less than 7 years until retirement 
age must invest only in the conservative fund.    19 
The impact of the reform is clearly visible in Table S.1. The reform greatly increased the 
SSW of men with university education (by more than 7 average annual earnings for some 
cohorts), and somewhat less of men with lower levels of education. It had a negative impact 
on women, and increasingly negative for the poorest women (women with elementary 
education born between 1955-59 lost 4.48 average annual earnings, women with university 
education of the same age lost 1.17). It also affected the intergenerational distribution of 
SSW, as older cohorts lost more or gained less than the younger cohorts irrespective of the 
workers’ gender or education.  
 
The stark difference between the impacts of the reform on workers with different education 
levels is illustrated in Figures S.1 and S.2. As the new benefit formula largely eliminated the 
redistribution from high-wage to low-wage workers, the PV of benefits fell by 36% for 
almost all working men with elementary education while it increased by between 61 to 71% 
for almost all working men with university education. The retired cohorts were affected only 
by a change in indexations and the PV of their benefits rose by 11-14%. The percentage 
change in contributions is the same for all education levels but differs by cohorts – those very 
close to retirement (1945-48) saw a large increase while the cohorts just at the beginning of 
their working careers experienced a 32% reduction in the present value of contributions.  
 
Figure S.3 and S.4 depict the differential impact in SSW terms. The SSW increased by at 
least 4 annual average earnings for all male cohorts with university education born in 1947 or 
later, and it increased by 7.6 annual average earnings for the 1982 cohort (i.e. just entering 
the labor market). It should be noted, however, that the pre-reform system was taxing the 
high-wage workers particularly heavily – an average man with university education who just 
started to work had a negative SSW of minus 13.1 average annual earnings. Young men with 
elementary education gained comparably little from the 2004-05 reform (0.7 average annual 
earnings), although their post-reform SSW is still higher (-2 average annual earnings) than 
that of men with university education.  
 
Table S.2 presents the impact of the reform on workers who decided to switch into the mixed 
system. Almost all workers gained slightly less or lost more (typically by 0.1 to 0.4 average 
annual earnings) than their counterparts who stayed in PAYG. In other words, w orkers 
should be better off staying in the PAYG system. This is true even for the group that is bound 
to gain most from the funded system, i.e. young men with university education. This finding   20 
is due to a combination of rather high fees charged by the pension funds and their very 
conservative investment strategy – even though the growth funds are allowed to invest 80% 
of their assets in stocks, they actually invest only 20%. While our calculations assume 
somewhat higher share (30%) the resulting projected nominal return of 6.9% is not sufficient 
to make switching into the mixed system attractive. It is our understanding that this very 
conservative strategy is induced by additional regulations of the funds’ performance. 
According to our calculations, the growth funds would have to invest 50% in stocks in order 
to achieve the 8.1% return required to make young men with university education indifferent 
between staying and switching. As Slovakia implemented a regulatory regime that yields to 
unnecessarily low returns on savings, the potential gains from the funded system appear to 
being foregone.  
 
3j. Slovakia: Reform 2006 
The last changes in the pension scheme came into force in 2007
30. The child deduction was 
abolished and the benefit formula started to count in the entire working history since 1984. 
Also the gradual adjustment in the benefit formula which was creating a stronger link 
between earnings and benefits and was supposed to be fully phased in by 2006 was prolonged 
till 2014, after which the benefits should indeed be linear in earnings.  
 
The reform kept the SSW of women essentially unchanged (Table S.3) with the exception of 
women with lower education born in 1940-45 who lost 0.4 average annual earnings. Also 
unaffected were men born before 1965 with less than university education. Men born after 
1965 suffered a reduction in SSW which was almost uniform across cohorts but varied across 
education levels. Men with elementary education lost on average only 0.12 average annual 
earnings, those with upper secondary education 0.19 and those with university education 
0.35. Among older cohorts, men with university education were the only ones who 
experienced a tangible loss from the 2006 reform. The differential impact on the PV of 





                                                           
30 Law No. 513/2006   21 
4. Conclusions 
We documented the existence of the policy risk of social security by computing changes in 
benefits, contributions, and the social security wealth induced by pension reforms in three 
transition countries, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. Although the policy risk has 
various sources it always materializes through pension reforms when the past promises are 
replaced by the new ones. Reforms usually involve numerous adjustments to contribution and 
benefit formulas that are complicated, not very transparent, and contain a large number of 
parameters.  Such adjustments may affect people of different ages and earnings histories 
differently, often times in ways that may not have been recognized or anticipated by the 
legislators.  
 
Our findings confirm that the policy risk is real and can be substantial. We also show that the 
PAYG system exposes workers to aggregate as well as intergenerational and 
intragenerational risk. For example, the 1993 Hungarian reform or the 1996 and 2002-03 
Czech reforms and the 2006 Slovak reforms were typical manifestation of the aggregate risk, 
cutting the social security wealth to most workers by amounts equal to several years of labor 
earnings. Both inter- and intra-generational risks were clearly present in the 1997 and 1998 
Hungarian and 2004-05 Slovak reforms. Some of the reforms affected different cohorts and 
education groups in quite peculiar ways. For example, the 1997 Hungarian reform provided 
sizeable gains to women born in the early 1940’s while simultaneously hurting everyone else. 
The 1998 Hungarian reform effectively created different sets of rules for workers who would 
retire before 2012 or after 2012, the latter group being rewarded with much larger SSW than 
the former. The 2004-05 Slovak reform substantially redistributed income across genders, 
cohorts and education levels such that the SSW of old women with elementary education fell 
by more than 4 average annual earnings while the SSW of young men with university 
education rose by more than 7 average annual earnings.   
 
The presence of policy risk of the PAYG system as documented here suggests a general 
policy implication that the choice between the PAYG and funded systems should perhaps 
follow the old investors’ strategy of “don’t put all your eggs in one basket”. Finding the 
optimal balance between the PAYG and funded pillar would require an appropriate 
quantitative comparison of risks involved in the both schemes, one that would characterize 
the policy risk in a similar way that stock market risk has traditionally been characterized.   22 
Making such comparison represents a challenge as the data-generating process driving the 
changes in the SSW induced by pension reforms is fundamentally different from the data-
generating process driving the stock market fluctuations. Our work may be regarded as the 
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Appendix A. Detailed assumptions 
 
Wage profiles 
Our “average” workers start working at age 20, work full-time until the standard retirement 
age
31, and they are earning the wage that is predicted by the wage profile specific for their 
gender, educational category, and calendar year. The wage profiles are estimated from 
individual level cross-sectional datasets described below and they have the standard form 
ijt ijt jt ijt jt jt ijt u a a w + + + =
2
2 1 log b b a  
where w is the monthly wage, subscript i denotes an individual, j denotes the worker’s gender 
and educational category,  t denotes year,  a is the worker’s age, and  α ,  β 1 and  β 2 are 
parameters that we estimate. The profiles were estimated on the sample of workers aged 
between 20 and the standard retirement age who worked at least 6 months in a given year. 
The regression estimates and the corresponding wage profiles are available upon request.  
 
We constructed the wage profiles from individual-level datasets that were best suited for the 
task in each country. All of them contain the basic information about each worker (gender, 
age, education level), and sufficient information about his/her employment status and labor 
income (either the monthly wage or the annual/quarterly wage and the number of 
weeks/months worked from which the monthly wage can be imputed.) For Hungary, we used 
the Harmonized Hungarian Wage Survey of the Public Employment Service. The survey was 
collected at the firm level in 1986, 1989 and annually since 1992 to 2003 and contains data 
on 100,000 to 200,000 employees depending on year. For the Czech Republic, we used the 
Czech Microcensus, a representative household survey conducted once every 4 or 6 years by 
the Czech Statistical Office. The surveys that we use were collected in 1992, 1996, and 
2002
32  and they cover approximately 44,000, 64,000 and 19,000 individuals in the respective 
years. For Slovakia, we used the TREXIMA dataset, a representative survey of firms. 
Collected in 2001, it contains quarterly data on 350,000 employees.  
 
                                                           
31 Workers with university education start working at age 22.  
32 Unfortunately, the 1988 microcensus was not usable for our purpose, since all observations are recorded at a 
household level but not individual level. Even though it does report the earnings of the head of household and 
his spouse, it does not allow identifying the gender of workers who live in households other than the traditional 
families of married couples.   26 
Since the samples allow estimating the wage profiles only for some years
33 while we need to 
have profiles for all years since 1988 (Hungary), 1986 (Czech Republic) or 1984 (Slovakia), 
we impute the profiles for the remaining years. We assume that the coefficients on the age 
and age squared are the same as in the nearest adjacent year for which the profile was 
estimated
34. Then we adjust the intercept α such that the average fitted wage in the sample is 
equal to the actual average wage in the year for which the wage profile is being imputed.
35  
 
 Macroeconomic assumptions 
Certain assumptions about the future were required to project future benefits and 
contributions. The length of life is probabilistic and the future money flows are discounted by 
the survival probability. We had survival probability tables for all countries (unfortunately 
without a finer breakdown by education categories) until 2004. For years 2005 and onwards, 
we assume that the survival probabilities are the same as in 2004.
36 
 
We assume that as of the time of the reform people had perfect foresight about the evolution 
of all economic variables that affect future taxes and benefits (aggregate and individual wage 
growth, inflation, survival probabilities). That is, future contributions and benefits that are 
expected as of time of the reform are equal to the wages and inflation rates that were actually 
realized up to 2005, and for the years 2006 onwards, we assume a 3% growth rate of real 
wages for all education categories and genders, and a 2% inflation rate.
37 
                                                           
33 The Hungarian Wage Survey is not available for 1987-1988, 1990-1991 and 2004+. Moreover, the surveys 
from 1993, 1998-1999 and 2002 appeared to contain data problems since the estimates of the wage profiles in 
these years produced estimates that were substantially different from the estimates for adjacent years and, more 
importantly, were economically implausible.  
34 For example, the coefficients on age and age squared estimated from the Czech 2002 Microcensus were used 
to generate wage profiles for 2000-2004. 
35 The average wages of employees by gender and education level were taken from the Czech Statistical Office 
publications "Prů měrné hrubé m ě s íční mzdy v letech 1996  - 2004 v t říd ěn í podle vzdělání a pohlaví 
zaměstnanců ", "Mzdová diferenciace v čs.národním hospodářství - zhodnocení vybraný ch aspektů  odměňování 
na základě jednorázového š etř ení o mzdách pracovníků  za červen 1984", and "Mzdy pracovníků  za červen 1988 
(z jednorázového vý běrového š etř ení o mzdách za červen 1988 ) - I.díl", which altogether cover the year 1984, 
1988, and 1996-2004. For the years 1985-87, and 1989-95, the average wages by education levels are not 
reported, only averages across all education levels. We imputed the average wages by education level by 
linearly extrapolating the ratios of the average wage in each education level to the overall average wage, and 
then multiplying this ratio with the overall average wage in each year for which the wages by education level 
were missing. For Hungary we computed the average wages from the Wage Survey and extrapolated them for 
the missing years. Slovak average wages were reported in  “Statistický  úrad SR: Priemerná mesačná mzda 
v hospodárstve SR a indexy miezd”.
 
36 This assumption leads likely underestimates the true survival probabilities since the life expectancies have 
been increasing in all three countries since the 1990’s and are expected to increase in the future. However, we 
were not able to obtain specific projections of future survival probabilities. 
37 These are roughly the rates of wage growth and inflation currently experienced by both countries.   27 
 
The rate of return on savings in pension funds is the key parameter affecting the benefits from 
the second  pillar. It is to a large extent determined by the regulations of the funds’ 
investments and fees. Our choice of the rates of return is an estimate of the net rate of return 
that the pension funds, as actually established and regulated by the Hungarian and Slovak 
law, are expected to deliver to their clients. That is, we avoid using an average historical 
return on some “optimal” stock and bond portfolio as commonly done in simulations of 
benefits from the funded pillar (e.g. Feldstein and Ranguelova 2001) since that approach 
would give the level of benefits that the funded pillar could provide rather than it did provide.  
 
For Hungary, the expected real return on savings is calculated as the weighted average of the 
real net return
38 of all Hungarian pension funds during 1998-2005, which was 2.7%
39. 
Pension funds in Slovakia were established too recently to project future returns from 
historical returns. Instead we compute the expected future returns as the average historical 
returns on the portfolios that the growth funds currently hold. Specifically, we calculate the 
average historical return for each of the major bond and stock indices in which the funds 
currently invest, and then compute the average of these returns weighted by their share in the 
average growth fund’s’ portfolio.
40 The resulting projected nominal rate of return after 
deducting fees is 6.9 percent.
41 As workers approach the retirement age they may prefer a 
gradual switch to a complete risk-free portfolio (and in Slovakia they are in fact required to 
switch for more conservative funds). We therefore assume that the above mentioned returns 
apply only from the beginning of employment until 15 years before retirement. Afterwards 
workers rebalance the portfolio each year such that the real return linearly decreases to zero 
by the age of retirement.  
 
                                                           
38 That is, after deducting the fees. 
39 Source: Czajlik and Szalay (2006) 
40 Specifically, the expected returns are computed from the returns on the following indices over the periods 
indicated: UX 1991-2007, PX 1995-2007, SLOVN SK 1999–2007, VIX 1990-2003, MXEU 1995-2007, 
FTSE 1990-2003, DAX 1990-2007, SPX 1990-2007. The funds’ stock portfolio is composed of stock indices in 
the Visegrad countries (20%), the EU-15 countries (50%), and the United States (30%). Data on the portfolio 
compositions were taken from the funds’ annual reports. 
 
41 The growth funds currently invest 80% of their assets in bonds, which appears to be an overtly conservative 
strategy, particularly if the legislation restricts them to invest at most 80% in stocks. Even though other 
regulations give funds incentives to invest in stocks below the maximum limit, several fund managers admit in 
official reports that they do plan to increase the share of stocks in the near future. In our computation of the 
expected return we therefore assume that they will invest 30% in stocks.   28 
The 2004-05 Slovak reform allowed one of the parents to deduct 0.5% for every child from 
their PAYG contributions. We assume that the deduction is claimed by men since they earn 
more on average, and we do all our calculations for a family with two children that has both 
children at the average age of first and second childbirth.
42  
 
Computing future indexations of benefits in the Czech Republic and Slovakia required 
additional assumptions. The legislation before the first reform did not prescribe any 
indexations, yet it is implausible to assume that the benefits or the system parameters would 
never be indexed. In fact, the benefits had been indexed in an ad-hoc manner with a clear 
goal to preserve their real value. Therefore we assume that once granted, benefits would have 
been indexed for inflation, and the income brackets in the benefit formula would be indexed 
for wage growth. Under these assumption, the replacement ratio
43  remains at a similar level 
(48-50%  in the Czech Republic, 30-35% in Slovakia) as it was during the years just 
preceding the reform.
44 After the 1996 reform, the Czech law prescribed minimum 
indexations, but the government frequently provided more generous increases. Therefore 
until 2006 we a ssume perfect foresight and compute the benefits as they were actually 




                                                           
42 The average age of mother at the first and second childbirth is 28 and 30, respectively. Source: Statistical 
Office of Slovak Republic, publication: “Pohyb obyvateľ stva v Slovenskej republike v roku 2006”. We assume 
the father is 2 years older than the mother. 
43 The ratio of the benefit to the (gross) wage in the last year before retirement 
44 In addition, prior to 1995, the new benefits were computed according to the old formula but were increased 
immediately (by 32% in 1995) to make up for the inflation that accumulated since 1990. We assume that such 
increases in newly granted benefits would continue into the future with the same purpose for compensating for a 
reduction in the real value of past wages that enter the benefit due to inflation. We increase the new benefits by 
32%, and further increase it by the ratio of the price index at the time of retirement to the average price index 
during the 5 years preceding retirement.    29 
Table A: Main Features of the Reforms 
Reform Retirement Age Contribution Rate Assessed Earnings Benefit Formula Funded System Retirement Indexation
HU (1993)
Men: 60                     
Women: 55 to 60 Employer: 24.5% Employee: 6%
average net monthly earnings during 4 years with 
highest earnings in the period of 5 years before 
retirement g average net monthly earnings from 1988 
until the year of retirement
degression [ average(net earnings after taxation * valorization) ] * accrual, 
taxation changes every year, after the reform the degression is less restrictive Net wage indexation
HU (1997)
Men: 60 to 62                        
Women: 55 to 62 Employer: 24.5% to 24.0% Employee: 6% higher accrual was applied
HU (1998)
PAYG: Employer: 24% to 23% (1999), to 22% 
(2000), Employee: 6% to 7% (1998), to 8% (1999), 
to 9% (2000)
degressions are less restricitve, higher accruals are applied, benefit as a 
fraction of average net earnings g a fraction of average gross earnings since 
2013
net wage indexation g Swiss 
indexation gradually 2001
Mixed system: Employer: 24% to 23% (1999), to 
22% (2000), Employee (PAYG): 1%, Employee 
(2nd pillar): 6% (1998), 7% (1999), 8% (2000)
degressions are less restricitve, higher accruals are applied, switchers’ 
accruals are 75%  of stayers’ accruals, benefit as a fraction of average gross 
earnings g a fraction of average net earnings since 2013
switchers receive unisex annuities from the amount 
invested at the pension fund
net wage indexation g Swiss 
indexation gradually 2001
HU (1999)
PAYG: Employer: 23% to 22% (1999), 22% to 21% 
(2000), Employee:  8% (1999), 9% to 8% (2000)
Mixed system: Employer: 23% to 22% (1999), 22% 
to 21% (2000, Employee (PAYG): 1% to 2%, 
Employee (2nd pillar): 7% to 6% (1999), 8% to 6% 
(2000)
HU (2003) PAYG: Employer: 18% , Employee:  8% to 8.5% additional (13th monthly) monthly pension benefit  gradually until 2006
Mixed system: Employer: 18%, Employee (PAYG): 
2% to 1.5%, Employee (2nd pillar):  6% to 7%  additional (13th monthly) monthly pension benefit  gradually until 2006
HU (2007)
PAYG: Employer: 17% to 21% (2007), 16% to 21% 
(2009, Employee:  8.5%
for entry pension benefits that will be granted between 2008 and 2012 
employees’ pension and health care contributions and the employees’ 
contribution to the employment fund will be deducted from the net earnings 
entering the calculation of the entry pension
Mixed system: Employer: 17% to 21% (2007), 16% 
to 21% (2009), Employee (PAYG): 0.5%, Employee 
(2nd pillar):  8% 
for entry pension benefits that will be granted between 2008 and 2012 
employees’ pension and health care contributions and the employees’ 
contribution to the employment fund will be deducted from the net earnings 
entering the calculation of the entry pension
CZ (1996)
Men: 60 to 62                      
Women: 55 to 59   Employer: 19.5% Employee: 6.5%
earnings from 5 years with the highest earnings during 
the 10 years priors to retirement g average monthly 
earnings from the 30 years of employment preceding 
retirement since 1986
B=B0+0.5∗I+0.01∗(max{y-25,0}+0.04∗max{y-R,0})∗I, where B is the
benefit, B0 is the fixed component of the benefit, I is the income base, y is the
number of years of insurance, and R is the eligibility age, there is degression
applied on past average earnings
indexation ad hoc g 
indexation as a combination 
of consumer price index and 
real wage growth
CZ (2002-03)
Men: 60 to 63                      
Women: 55 to 61  
Employer: 19.5% to 21.5%                                                         
Employee: 6.5%
change g annual indexation 
with inflation plus min 33% 
of real wage growth
SK (2004-05)
Men: 60 to 62                     
Women: 55 to 62  
PAYG: Employer: 20.6% to 16% (2004), to 14% 
(2005), Employee: 5.9% to 4%, one of the parents 
can deduct additional 0.5% in contributions for every 
child
B=B0+0.5∗I+0.01∗(max{y-25,0}+0.04∗max{y-R,0})∗I, where B is the
benefit, B0 is the fixed component of the benefit, I is the income base, y is the
number of years of insurance, and R is the eligibility age, there is degression
applied on past average earnings
indexation ad hoc g  Swiss 
indexation 
Mixed system: Employer (PAYG): 5% (2005), 
Employer (2nd pillar): 9% (2005), Employee:  4%, 
one of the parents can deduct additional 0.5% in 
contributions for every child
earnings from 5 years with the highest earnings during 
the 10 years priors to retirement g entire working 
period since 1994, which in turn should be at least 10 
years
B = APV * APWP*(N - M/2), where M is a number of years of paying 
contribution in the mixed system. 
switchers receive unisex annuities from the amount 
invested at the pension fund, they pay remuneration for 
managing the pension fund (0.07% of the average 
monthly net value of assets), remuneration for keeping 
personal pension account (1% of the amount of 
contribution)
indexation ad hoc g  Swiss 
indexation 
SK (2006)
Employee: the  0.5% deduction in contributions for 
every child was abolished
entire working period since 1994, which in turn should 
be at least 10 years g entire working period since 
1984, which in turn should be at least 20 years change in calculation of APWP    30 
Tables –  Hungary  
Men
Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University
1935-39 -0.01 -0.03 -0.19 -0.23 1935-39 0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.34
1940-44 0.11 0.07 -0.03 -0.16 -0.48 -0.63 -1.04 -1.45 1940-44 -0.69 -0.84 -1.18 -1.66 0.63 0.74 0.99 1.00
1945-49 0.27 0.25 0.15 0.09 -0.45 -0.46 -0.79 -2.06 1945-49 -0.49 -0.53 -0.70 -1.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.60
1950-54 0.23 0.24 0.11 0.10 -0.45 -0.50 -0.83 -2.15 1950-54 -0.42 -0.45 -0.59 -0.92 -0.31 -0.34 -0.45 -0.97
1955-59 0.19 0.19 0.06 0.06 -0.43 -0.52 -0.87 -2.07 1955-59 -0.35 -0.38 -0.50 -0.77 -0.27 -0.29 -0.39 -0.86
1960-64 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.02 -0.41 -0.53 -0.88 -2.02 1960-64 -0.31 -0.34 -0.44 -0.67 -0.24 -0.26 -0.35 -0.78
1965-69 0.13 0.12 -0.06 -0.01 -0.40 -0.54 -0.89 -1.95 1965-69 -0.27 -0.29 -0.38 -0.58 -0.21 -0.23 -0.30 -0.69
1970-74 0.09 0.08 -0.08 0.03 -0.39 -0.53 -0.85 -1.80 1970-74 -0.23 -0.25 -0.34 -0.51 -0.18 -0.20 -0.26 -0.63
1975-79 0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.04 -0.38 -0.52 -0.82 -1.67 1975-79 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.46 -0.15 -0.17 -0.23 -0.57
1980-84 0.04 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.39 -0.52 -0.81 -1.57 1980-84 -0.18 -0.20 -0.28 -0.43 -0.14 -0.16 -0.21 -0.54
1985-89 0.02 0.00 -0.12 0.01 -0.39 -0.51 -0.79 -1.50 1985-89 -0.17 -0.19 -0.26 -0.41 -0.13 -0.15 -0.20 -0.51
1990-94 0.01 -0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0.38 -0.50 -0.76 -1.44 1990-94 -0.16 -0.18 -0.25 -0.38 -0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.48
Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University
1935-39 -1.13 -1.21 -1.36 -1.46
1940-44 -0.38 -0.16 0.69 2.08 -1.74 -1.92 -2.49 -1.91
1945-49 -0.05 0.21 1.06 2.72 -0.57 -0.37 0.57 2.55
1950-54 0.07 0.37 1.36 3.49 -0.47 -0.25 0.78 3.46 1951-54 -0.57 -0.32 0.51 2.41 -1.10 -1.00 -0.31 1.72
1955-59 0.04 0.31 1.17 3.24 -0.44 -0.26 0.65 3.27 1955-59 -0.47 -0.26 0.46 2.29 -0.84 -0.78 -0.24 1.57
1960-64 -0.03 0.20 0.88 2.77 -0.42 -0.29 0.44 2.78 1960-64 -0.38 -0.19 0.42 2.21 -0.58 -0.53 -0.14 1.45
1965-69 -0.08 0.10 0.65 2.44 -0.40 -0.31 0.29 2.45 1965-69 -0.31 -0.14 0.39 2.17 -0.34 -0.31 -0.02 1.42
1970-74 -0.12 0.03 0.54 2.37 -0.36 -0.29 0.26 2.45 1970-74 -0.23 -0.08 0.42 2.27 -0.10 -0.09 0.15 1.58
1975-79 -0.12 0.02 0.48 2.27 -0.30 -0.24 0.26 2.47 1975-79 -0.14 0.00 0.46 2.28 0.12 0.12 0.32 1.71
1980-84 -0.08 0.03 0.45 2.14 -0.22 -0.15 0.29 2.45 1980-84 -0.07 0.05 0.47 2.17 0.27 0.28 0.42 1.70
1985-89 -0.04 0.06 0.45 2.04 -0.14 -0.09 0.32 2.36 1985-89 -0.03 0.08 0.47 2.06 0.35 0.35 0.45 1.63
1990-94 0.00 0.09 0.44 1.95 -0.08 -0.03 0.34 2.26 1990-94 0.00 0.10 0.46 1.97 0.39 0.38 0.47 1.56
Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University
1935-39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
1940-44 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
1945-49 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.15
1950-54 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.24 1951-54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.03
1955-59 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.34 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.31 1955-59 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.06
1960-64 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.42 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.37 1960-64 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.04 0.09
1965-69 0.19 0.21 0.28 0.50 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.42 1965-69 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 0.11
1970-74 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.56 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.47 1970-74 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.04 0.13
1975-79 0.23 0.27 0.34 0.59 0.21 0.23 0.30 0.51 1975-79 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.16 -0.12 -0.11 -0.04 0.15
1980-84 0.24 0.27 0.34 0.57 0.21 0.23 0.30 0.50 1980-84 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.05 0.16
1985-89 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.54 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.47 1985-89 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.05 0.15
1990-94 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.51 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.45 1990-94 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.04 0.15
Men
H.4 Reform 1998, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage H.3 Reform 1998, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage
H.5 Reform 1999, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage
Women Women
H.1 Reform 1993, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage H.2 Reform 1997, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage
Men Men
Women Women Men Men
Women Women
H.6 Reform 1999, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage
Men
 
Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University
1935-39 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.40
1940-44 0.37 0.41 0.53 0.69 0.31 0.36 0.47 0.57
1945-49 0.36 0.40 0.50 0.68 0.42 0.47 0.61 0.81
1950-54 0.29 0.33 0.43 0.62 0.35 0.39 0.52 0.76 1951-54 0.24 0.27 0.36 0.53 0.30 0.33 0.43 0.61
1955-59 0.24 0.27 0.35 0.52 0.30 0.33 0.44 0.66 1955-59 0.21 0.23 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.31 0.39 0.54
1960-64 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.27 0.29 0.38 0.56 1960-64 0.18 0.20 0.26 0.39 0.27 0.29 0.35 0.47
1965-69 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.32 0.48 1965-69 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.34 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.42
1970-74 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.29 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.44 1970-74 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.31 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.40
1975-79 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.41 1975-79 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.38
1980-84 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.37 1980-84 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.35
1985-89 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.35 1985-89 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.33
1990-94 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.34 1990-94 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.32
Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University
1935-39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1940-44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1945-49 -0.26 -0.29 -0.37 -0.66 -0.21 -0.24 -0.30 -0.47
1950-54 -0.25 -0.28 -0.38 -0.61 -0.24 -0.26 -0.35 -0.63 1951-54 -0.21 -0.24 -0.34 -0.52 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.55
1955-59 -0.33 -0.38 -0.53 -0.85 -0.31 -0.34 -0.47 -0.86 1955-59 -0.33 -0.38 -0.53 -0.85 -0.31 -0.34 -0.47 -0.86
1960-64 -0.46 -0.53 -0.72 -1.22 -0.43 -0.47 -0.64 -1.16 1960-64 -0.46 -0.53 -0.72 -1.22 -0.43 -0.47 -0.64 -1.16
1965-69 -0.58 -0.67 -0.90 -1.58 -0.54 -0.58 -0.80 -1.44 1965-69 -0.58 -0.67 -0.90 -1.58 -0.54 -0.58 -0.80 -1.44
1970-74 -0.70 -0.81 -1.07 -1.91 -0.64 -0.69 -0.95 -1.69 1970-74 -0.70 -0.81 -1.07 -1.91 -0.64 -0.69 -0.95 -1.69
1975-79 -0.81 -0.94 -1.22 -2.19 -0.74 -0.80 -1.08 -1.90 1975-79 -0.81 -0.94 -1.22 -2.19 -0.74 -0.80 -1.08 -1.90
1980-84 -0.92 -1.04 -1.35 -2.40 -0.83 -0.89 -1.20 -2.09 1980-84 -0.92 -1.04 -1.35 -2.40 -0.83 -0.89 -1.20 -2.09
1985-89 -0.99 -1.12 -1.45 -2.45 -0.90 -0.96 -1.28 -2.15 1985-89 -0.99 -1.12 -1.45 -2.45 -0.90 -0.96 -1.28 -2.15
1990-94 -0.97 -1.09 -1.40 -2.33 -0.88 -0.94 -1.24 -2.04 1990-94 -0.97 -1.09 -1.40 -2.33 -0.88 -0.94 -1.24 -2.04
Men Men
Men Men
H.8 Reform 2003, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage
H.9 Reform 2007, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage H.10 Reform 2007, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage
Women Women
Women Women
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Tables –  Czech Republic 
Cohort Elementary Lower  Upper  University Elementary Lower  Upper  University Cohort Elementary Lower  Upper  University Elementary Lower  Upper  University
1936-39 0.00 -0.08 -0.34 -0.31 1941-44 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
1940-44 -1.30 -1.26 -1.48 -1.22 2.38 2.03 1.36 0.96 1945-49 -0.09 -0.10 -0.18 -0.23 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
1945-49 -1.79 -1.62 -1.83 -1.54 -1.24 -1.37 -1.13 -1.12 1950-54 -0.44 -0.49 -0.60 -0.78 -0.54 -0.55 -0.65 -0.86
1950-54 -1.97 -1.80 -1.99 -1.68 -1.74 -2.04 -1.82 -1.70 1955-59 -0.56 -0.61 -0.74 -0.99 -0.85 -0.90 -1.10 -1.38
1955-59 -2.17 -2.02 -2.15 -1.78 -2.02 -2.35 -2.06 -1.87 1960-64 -0.61 -0.67 -0.82 -1.12 -0.90 -0.94 -1.18 -1.49
1960-64 -2.42 -2.29 -2.30 -1.80 -2.31 -2.63 -2.17 -1.94 1965-69 -0.64 -0.70 -0.87 -1.21 -0.91 -0.95 -1.21 -1.53
1965-69 -2.66 -2.56 -2.50 -1.88 -2.63 -2.94 -2.32 -2.08 1970-74 -0.70 -0.77 -0.95 -1.34 -0.96 -1.01 -1.29 -1.63
1970-74 -2.86 -2.73 -2.65 -1.96 -2.88 -3.18 -2.44 -2.17 1975-79 -0.76 -0.83 -1.03 -1.46 -0.99 -1.04 -1.32 -1.67
1975-79 -3.04 -2.89 -2.80 -2.05 -3.10 -3.40 -2.56 -2.25 1980-84 -0.79 -0.85 -1.06 -1.51 -0.99 -1.04 -1.33 -1.67
1980-84 -3.26 -3.10 -3.01 -2.20 -3.37 -3.68 -2.77 -2.43 1985-89 -0.81 -0.88 -1.08 -1.50 -1.02 -1.08 -1.38 -1.69
1985-89 -3.44 -3.26 -3.18 -2.30 -3.59 -3.91 -2.91 -2.52 1990-94 -0.82 -0.88 -1.09 -1.49 -1.05 -1.10 -1.40 -1.71
1990-94 -3.63 -3.43 -3.35 -2.39 -3.81 -4.14 -3.05 -2.62 1995-99 -0.79 -0.85 -1.05 -1.43 -1.02 -1.08 -1.37 -1.66
1995-96 -3.86 -3.65 -3.58 -2.55 -4.05 -4.40 -3.26 -2.81 2000-03 -0.82 -0.88 -1.07 -1.45 -1.08 -1.13 -1.43 -1.72
Men Men Women Women
C.1 Reform 1996, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual average earnings C.2 Reform 2002-03, Change in SSW as a fraction of the annual average earnings
 
 
Tables –  Slovakia 
Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University
1935-39 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.42
1940-44 0.21 0.24 0.52 0.89
1945-49 -2.38 -1.83 -0.41 3.97 0.46 0.49 0.59 0.98
1950-54 -1.83 -1.22 0.11 4.69 -4.25 -3.99 -2.74 -0.15 1953-54 -1.72 -1.16 0.14 4.59
1955-59 -1.29 -0.66 0.62 5.27 -4.48 -4.24 -3.17 -0.83 1955-59 -1.38 -0.80 0.45 4.94 -4.61 -4.40 -3.31 -1.17
1960-64 -0.80 -0.14 1.10 5.89 -4.08 -3.82 -2.83 -0.43 1960-64 -0.91 -0.32 0.90 5.51 -4.25 -4.05 -3.02 -0.88
1965-69 -0.37 0.33 1.54 6.42 -3.64 -3.34 -2.37 0.10 1965-69 -0.49 0.14 1.33 6.05 -3.82 -3.59 -2.59 -0.40
1970-74 0.01 0.76 1.92 6.86 -3.25 -2.89 -1.95 0.54 1970-74 -0.10 0.57 1.72 6.53 -3.43 -3.17 -2.18 0.04
1975-79 0.35 1.13 2.28 7.31 -2.87 -2.47 -1.53 1.01 1975-79 0.26 0.95 2.08 6.96 -3.05 -2.75 -1.76 0.49
1980-84 0.65 1.45 2.58 7.55 -2.51 -2.07 -1.12 1.39 1980-84 0.56 1.28 2.37 7.15 -2.70 -2.36 -1.35 0.82
1985-89 0.75 1.54 2.62 7.24 -2.29 -1.84 -0.92 1.38 1985-89 0.67 1.38 2.41 6.85 -2.48 -2.12 -1.15 0.83
1990-94 0.71 1.46 2.49 6.87 -2.17 -1.75 -0.87 1.31 1990-94 0.63 1.30 2.29 6.50 -2.35 -2.02 -1.09 0.79
Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University Cohort Elementary Lower Upper University Elementary Lower Upper University
1935-39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1940-44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1945-49 0.30 0.19 0.02 -0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1950-54 0.08 0.09 -0.05 -0.26 0.44 0.40 -0.03 -0.16 1953-54 0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.10
1955-59 0.00 0.03 -0.10 -0.25 -0.06 -0.01 -0.14 -0.11 1955-59 0.00 0.02 -0.08 -0.21 -0.05 -0.01 -0.13 -0.09
1960-64 -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 -0.45 -0.10 -0.02 -0.13 -0.20 1960-64 -0.06 -0.05 -0.15 -0.37 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.15
1965-69 -0.11 -0.11 -0.21 -0.41 -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.13 1965-69 -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.35 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09
1970-74 -0.12 -0.14 -0.19 -0.32 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1970-74 -0.12 -0.13 -0.18 -0.31 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01
1975-79 -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1975-79 -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1980-84 -0.13 -0.16 -0.19 -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1980-84 -0.13 -0.16 -0.19 -0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1985-89 -0.13 -0.15 -0.18 -0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1985-89 -0.13 -0.15 -0.18 -0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1990-94 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1990-94 -0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Men Men
Men Men Women Women
S.1 Reform 2004-05, pay-as-you-go, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage S.2 Reform 2004-05, mixed system, Change in SSW as a fraction of annual average wage
Women Women
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H.3 - SSW before and after the 1997 reform, 












































































H.4 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 1998 reform, 



























H.5 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 1998 reform, 



























H.6 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 1998 reform, 



























H.8 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 1999 reform, 





























H.7 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 1999 reform, 





























H.9 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 2003 reform, 



















































H.10 - Percentage change in PV of taxes and benefits, 2007 reform, 
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C.1 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 1996 reform, 






























C.2 - SSW before and after the 1996 reform, 

















































































C.3 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 1996 reform, 




























C.4 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 2002-03 reform, 

































C.5 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 2002-03 reform, 
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S.1 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 2004-05 reform, 


















































































































S.2 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 2004-05 reform, 


















































































































S.5 - Percentage change in PV  of contributions and benefits, 2006 reform, 

































S.6 - Percentage change in PV of contributions and benefits, 2006 reform, 
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